

~~TOP SECRET~~Mr. La
Rm. 2171

"CIC-A-31.02"

From:

X 7/26 Assistant Executive for Operations

To:

X Assistant Executive Director

N.I.A.
Directive
No. 5Copy No. 1 of 3 copies
of draft N.I.A.
paper, same subject,
dated 18 June 1946.

X Recommendation

SUBJECT: Provision for the Collection of Foreign Intelligence
Information by Clandestine Methods.Recommend that no further action be taken on enclosed report
in view of paragraph 4-a of N.I.A. Directive No. 5.

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C.I.G. DIRECTIVE SURVEY OF FACILITIES FOR COLLECTING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BY CLANDESTINE METHODS

25X1A Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence,
with the Unanimous Concurrence
of the Intelligence Advisory Board

References: a. C.I.G. Directive
b. N.I.A. Directives Nos. 1 and 2

25X1A 1. By C.I.G. TOP SECRET Directive dated 19 February 1946, an ad hoc committee was established to make a study of the facilities, resources, and operations of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and submit recommendations. Pursuant to paragraph 4-b, N.I.A. Directive No. 2, it is now necessary to initiate a broad survey of all existing Government facilities for the collection of foreign intelligence information by clandestine methods. This memorandum states the provisions which will govern this survey.

2. Intelligence Advisory Board. In addition to the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a member for the purposes of this survey.

3. a. The scope of this survey will include all clandestine methods for collecting foreign intelligence information, except the intercept of electric communications.

b. The objectives will be:

(1) To secure sound descriptions of methods used now or during the war, including details of training, administration, finance, communications, control and all other details required for complete understanding.

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- (2) To produce uniform terminology.
- (3) To secure correct estimates of the productivity and efficiency of the various methods.
- (4) To appraise the availability of trained and qualified personnel.
- (5) To appraise the facilities of separate departments or permanent agencies for conducting various phases of clandestine operations, either separately or jointly.
- (6) To determine whether particular phases of clandestine operations may be performed more efficiently as central services.
- (7) To prepare recommendations for submission to the National Intelligence Authority.

a. The Central Planning Staff, C.I.G., will conduct the survey. It will be authorized to call for personnel indicated in paragraph 5, below, to appear and give such oral or written reports as may be required for purposes of the survey. It will also have full access to the studies and recommendations of the committee established to survey SSU activities, and will be authorized to secure additional pertinent information from members of that committee.

b. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will appoint a representative to serve as an expert consultant with the Central Planning Staff for the purposes of this survey.

5. Each member of the Intelligence Advisory Board will designate a representative to arrange details with the Central Planning Staff, including furnishing the C.I.G. a list of personnel authorized to give information for purposes of the survey. This list will include available persons who are now familiar, or who during the war have been familiar, with the actual operating details of the clandestine methods used.

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These personnel will be instructed that they are to furnish all information which the Central Planning Staff requires for purposes of the survey. They will be authorized to make suggestions and express opinions, carefully distinguishing between personal views and official views of departments or agencies. They will also be authorized to suggest the names of additional personnel who may be able to throw light on the matters considered.

6. The Central Planning Staff will submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence. He will then submit appropriate recommendations to the National Intelligence Authority, after concurrence or comment by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

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A FOREIGN ROLE FOR THE FBI/

Such security intelligence cannot be secured from domestic operations alone.

The postwar period will see a number of security operations which will be continued, and which should be serviced by the best and most efficient intelligence available:

1. The desire to include security checks in the process of issuing visas and passports will continue. This need will be serviced in one way or another. Similarly other operations such as the investigation of personnel employed in our important Foreign Service, and the furnishing of background information on individuals involved in business and international finance or other matters in which the State Department and Commerce Department will be involved, will require ready reference to this type of information. In spite of the obvious advantage of maintaining all available information of this type to service such needs in one place, this has been impossible to achieve under the present divided and competitive pattern.

2. In addition to the continuance of a considerable security intelligence operation, there is the need to continue security planning. Just as Byron Price pointed out, in connection with Censorship planning, that a small group would be needed to continue a nucleus operation, it will be necessary to maintain a skeleton operation in this whole field.

3. A further need for the continuance of services similar to those rendered by the FBI is that of assisting such agencies as the State Department, in insuring the maximum amount of security with respect to communications, records, personnel, etc. This last need is quite acute. Our Foreign Service has been notoriously loose. This has given top officers in the State Department considerable concern. Some provision to take care of this problem will undoubtedly be made in the State Department unless it can secure the service elsewhere.

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The fulfillment of these operational requirements does not necessarily involve a decision as to whether secret or clandestine operations will be permitted. The activities listed above can be, if necessary, conducted completely in the open, although with greatly diminished effectiveness. In any event the job will only be properly done if utilization is made of the skills, records and domestic organization available in the FBI.

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